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In this paper we study futures market depth by examining the price path due to order 
imbalances thereby allowing us to directly gain insight in the execution costs due to a 
lack of market depth. We propose a two dimensional market depth measure in which the 
price path due to order imbalances is described by an S-shape function. The proposed 
market depth measure is applied to transaction specific futures data from Euronext. 
Subsequently, we examine CBOT traders’ perceptions about the price path due to order 
imbalances and examine the characteristics that are associated with a particular 
perception. The proposed market depth measure gives guidelines for improving market 
depth, and can be used to compare competitive futures contracts. It appears that the actual 
price path due to order imbalances does not match the perceived price path. Traders have 
various perceptions about the price path due to order imbalances. Dominant perceptions 
were, S -shape, linear, exponential or zigzag price paths. The differences in traders’ 
perceptions can be traced back to different traders’ characteristics among others type of 
primary futures contract traded, importance of information sources and trading strategy 
(herd vs. non-herd behavior). The observed disconnect between perceptions and revealed 
price path due to order imbalances have great implications for market participants who 
try to minimize execution costs and for the futures exchange management that tries to 
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Introduction 
The lack of sufficient market depth results in relatively high hedging costs, and inhibits 
the growth of futures contract volume. In this paper the price path due to order 
imbalances is analyzed and a two-dimensional market depth measure is derived and 
tested using transaction specific data from Euronext. Subsequently, we compare the 
results with the perceptions that CBOT traders have about the price path due to order 
imbalances. Contrasting the revealed versus perceived price path due to order imbalances 
provides the management of the futures exchange with a framework for improving their 
market depth and gives hedgers a better understanding of market depth risk.  
  A key aspect of futures market performance is the degree of liquidity in the 
market (Cuny, 1993). The relationship between market depth and futures contract success 
has been thoroughly investigated in the literature (Black, 1986). A futures market is 
considered liquid if traders and participants can buy or sell futures contracts quickly with 
little price effect resulting from their transactions. However, in thin markets, the 
transactions of individual hedgers may have significant price effects and result in 
substantial ‘transaction costs’ (Thompson, Waller, and Seibold, 1993). 
These transaction costs are the premiums that traders are forced to pay or the discounts 
they are forced to accept in order to establish or close out futures positions (Ward and 
Behr, 1993). Although, hedgers can take positions that offset each other, a futures market, 
if it is to be successful, should normally create more market depth in the form of 
attracting additional traders. 
In the literature, liquidity is often synonymous with the bid-ask spread for a given 
number of futures. The bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity has some limitations. 
Price may change between the moment the market maker buys and sells, and the trader 
can earn much more or much less than the spread quoted at the time of the first 
transaction suggests. Hence, the trader faces costs due to changes in the bid-ask spread. 
Yet these costs are the essence of market liquidity (Grossman and Miller, 1988). The 
concept of market depth (the number of securities that can be traded at given bid and ask 
quotas), an aspect of market liquidity, does not suffer from the limitations of the bid-ask 
spread (Berkman, 1993; Harris, 1990; Kyle, 1985). Therefore, we turn to an examination 
of market depth as a measure of liquidity. 
The objective of our study is two fold. First we want to improve insights into market 
depth and the effect it may have on the performance of futures contracts and, 
consequently, on the success of futures exchanges. Second we want to gain insight in 
how a lack of  market depth, and particularly the shape of the price path due to order 
imbalances, is perceived by futures traders. In the literature, measures of market depth 
have not explicitly considered the price path produced by temporary order imbalances. 
Often there is an implicit assumption of linearity  which allows  only a limited 
understanding of the costs associated with lack of market depth. Thus the management of 
the exchange gets only a limited insight into how the problem of a lack of market depth 
should be dealt with. We propose and parameterize a model that pays explicit attention to 
the price path caused by temporary order imbalances. With more information about these 
price paths, we will be able to distinguish two dimensions of market depth that can be 
related to the toolbox of the futures exchange (the trading system and trading rules). 
Evaluating different (competing) futures contracts and futures exchanges  using  these 
dimensions can shed light on the performance of the futures contract as a price-risk   3 
management instrument. In addition, having insight in the perceptions that traders have 
about the price path due to order imbalances allows us new insight in market efficiency 
and how well traders are able to distinguish between price movements due to order 
balances and fundamental shifts. 
This paper is organized as follows. First the measures of liquidity - and in particular the 
measures of market depth - are examined. Subsequently, we present a hypothesis of the 
underlying structure of market depth from which a market depth price path model is then 
derived. Than we presents an analysis of market depth for three selected futures contracts 
using transaction specific data from Euronext. Subsequently, we investigate traders 
perceptions about the price path due to order imbalances and examine the characteristics 
of traders that are associated with a particular perception. Finally the results and main 
conclusions are summarized. 
 
 
Measures of Liquidity, Particularly Market Depth 
Previous research developed measures of  liquidity on the basis of indices usually 
represented by some weighting of trading activity (Working, 1960; Larson, 1961; 
Powers, 1979; Ward and Behr, 1974; Ward and Dasse, 1977). An important element in 
these measures is the proportion of hedging to speculative trading volumes. Several 
researchers (Roll, 1984; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Thompson and Waller, 1987; 
Stoll, 1989; Smith and Whaley, 1994) propose methods for an indirect estimation of 
liquidity costs. A  liquidity cost proxy based on the estimated covariance of prices has 
been introduced by Roll (1984). Another accepted proxy for the bid-ask spread has been 
proposed by Thompson and Waller (1988), who argue that the average absolute value of 
price changes is a direct measure of the average execution cost of trading in a contract. 
Smith and Whaley (1994) use a method of moments estimator to determine the bid-ask 
spread. This estimator uses all successive price change data, and assumes that observed 
futures transaction prices are equally likely to occur at bid and ask. 
Market depth measures are rather scarce. Brorsen (1989) uses the standard deviation of 
the log price changes as a proxy for market depth. Lehmann and Modest (1994) study 
market depth by examining the adjustment of quotas to trades and the utilization of the 
chui kehai trading mechanism on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, where the chui kehai are 
warning quotas when a portion of the trade is executed at different pre-specified prices. 
Utilizing the chui kehai trading mechanism can give an indication of market depth, but 
cannot be used to measure it. Other researchers such as Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) 
use both price volatility and open interest as a proxy for market depth. Common to all 
these market depth measures is the fact that they are based on transaction price variability 
(Huang and Stoll, 1994, 1996) and implicitly assume that the price path due to temporary 
order imbalances is linear (see, for example, Kyle, 1985). H owever, there is no reason 
that the price path is linear, particularly when large orders are concerned. Therefore, we 
propose a non-linear function which relates the futures price to successive trades. 
In the literature there are no measures that reflect the shape of the price path due to 
order imbalances, in sight of the fact that is this shape that provides insight into the 
underlying structure of market depth and that determines the execution costs that hedgers 
face.  
   4 
 
A Market Depth Model 
 
Conceptual Model 





, where PF is the futures 
price and Q is the quantity traded. As discussed in the previous section, current market 
depth measures are based on transaction price variability and implicitly assume the price 
path due to order imbalances to be linear. In this section we hypothesize that the price 
path arising from order imbalances can be characterized by an S-shaped curve. During 
the occurrence of such an S -curve, the equilibrium price change is assumed to be 
constant.
1 The price path is downward-sloping in the case of a sell order imbalance and 
upward-sloping in the case of a buy order imbalance (Working, 1977; Kyle, 1985; 
Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993). 
---------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
The market depth price path is caused by frictions in the market structure which 
includes the trading system and the rules of the exchange. The quality of the market 
information generated by the trading system regarding high price, low price, last price, 
size of last trade etc., is crucial for such frictions and hence, for the market depth price 
path (see Domowitz, 1993a,b) for a description of trading systems and their impact on 
market depth). 
The S-shaped price path can only be identified ex post. Recognized market efficiency 
theory would suggest that the price would not adjust in a predictable way (Fama, 1991). 
However, at the moment the price changes, the participants are not able to identify 
whether the price movement is due to fundamental economic factors causing a change in 
the equilibrium price or whether it is due to a lack of market depth generated by market 
frictions caused by the trading system itself. 
A priori we do not assume that the downward-sloping S-shaped price path is exactly 
the reverse of the upward-sloping price path. It is possible, for example, that there are 
many stop-loss buy orders and hardly any stop-loss sell ones and vice versa, thus causing 
an asymmetry between upward-sloping and downward-sloping price paths (Chan and 
Lakonishok, 1993).  
 
Mathematical Specification of the Model 
In the mathematical model showing the conceptual model of market depth, both sell and 
buy orders (downward- and upward-sloping price paths) are taken into account. An 
upward-sloping S-shaped path may well be approximated by a Gompertz curve, since this 
curve has a non-symmetrical S-shape and thus, does not impose restrictions on the length 
of the different phases. The Gompertz model is a growth curve and can therefore only be 
used to describe an upward-sloping price path. However, subtracting a downward-sloping 
price path from an appropriate constant may establish an upward-sloping price path 
which will cover the four phases. Consequently, after transforming the data, the price 
path will always be upward-sloping. We can describe the transformed price series using 
the Gompertz model given by   5 
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where  i TPF  is the transformed price of futures contract i  (i = 0,1,2,...,n) and  b a,  and d 
are positive parameters. Since the price path is restricted to start in the minimum tick 
size,  0 TPF  is equal to the minimum tick size. The parameter  b is determined by both  a 










TPF  The parameters a and dof the Gompertz model capture two 
dimensions of market depth. The first dimension, represented by  a minus the minimum 
tick size, indicates how far the price rises (falls) as a consequence of a lack of market 
depth. The second dimension, presented by  d, has a one-to-one relation with the rate of 
adjustment, which, as we will show below, is equal to  )] exp( 1 [ d - - , see Chow (1967) 
and Franses (1994a,b). This rate of adjustment may be translated into costs in terms of 
price risk; the futures price may change before actual order execution. 
Taking natural logarithms of (1) yields 
 
(2)  ) exp( ln ) ( ln i TPFi d - b - a =    
 
A convenient representation of the Gompertz process is obtained by subtracting 
) ( ln 1 - i TPF  from (2) which can be written as: 
 
(3)  )] ( ln )][ln exp( 1 [ ) ( ln D 1 - - a d - - = i i TPF TPF    
 
where D is the first order differencing filter defined by  1 D - - = i i i z z z . Equation (3) is 
of particular interest because it can be interpreted as a partial price adjustment model. In 
order to see this, note that  1 )] exp( 1 [ 0 < d - - < . As a consequence, although  a will 
always exceed  i TPF ,  ) ( ln i TPF  is rising toward  a ln  at a constant rate of adjustment 
)] exp( 1 [ d - - . For instance, if  1 . 0 )] exp( 1 [ = d - - , it will take many more contracts to 
achieve a particular price rise than in the situation where  5 . 0 )] exp( 1 [ = d - - , ceteris 
paribus. Similarly, if  a ln  exceeds  ) ( ln i TPF  by one per cent of  ) ( ln i TPF , then 
) ( ln i TPF  will increase by  100 x )] exp( 1 [ d - -  per cent. In addition,  ) exp( d -  is the 
elasticity of  i TPF  with respect to  1 - i TPF . 
The parameters of the model  provide  an indication  of market depth. A n increase 
(decrease) of both  a and  d implies a decrease (increase) of the market depth. When a 
and  d have opposite signs we have two counter acting forces. If the order is relatively 
large the first dimension, a, is particularly relevant as far as incurring execution costs are 
concerned. For relatively small orders the second dimension  d is relevant. Table 1 
summarizes the effects of changes in the two dimensions on market depth. 
------------------------ 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------   6 
The model in (3) may be extended on three fronts. First, Equation (3) is an 
approximation to the transformed price series. Hence, we add a disturbance term  i u  to (3) 
under the assumption that  ) I IID(0,
2 ~ n i u s . Second, notice that the transaction-specific 
price observations cannot be described by a single curve such as the curve depicted in 
Figure 1, but by a sequence of such curves where an upward-sloping curve is always 
succeeded by a downward-sloping one and the other way round. As a consequence, the 
data series on the transformed price consists of a panel (not restricted to being balanced) 
of upward-sloping curves in chronological order. Third, as discussed in section 3.4.1, to 
allow upward- and actually downward-sloping curves to have dissimilar shapes, (3) is 
extended to: 
 
(4)  ci i c s s ci u TPF TPF + t - p = - ) ( ln ) ( ln D 1 ,    
                   s.t.  u ~  ) I , 0 ( IID
2
N s  
 
where  , ln )] exp( 1 [ s s s a d - - = p   )], exp( 1 [ s s d - - = t   c n i , , 1 K =  with  H c , , 1 K =  
and s is an index for actually upward-  ) 1 ( = s  and downward-sloping  ) 2 ( = s  curves. H 
denotes the number of curves. Notice that our dataset on  ci TPF  consists of  c
H
c n N 1 = ￿ =  
observations (i.e., traded contracts), where  c n  is the number of contracts per curve  . c  In 
the next section more details are given on how we obtain these observations. 
 
Estimation of the Model 
In our theoretical model we assume that during the occurrence of an S-shaped price path, 
the equilibrium price is constant and, therefore, the S-shaped price path is attributed 
solely to temporary order imbalances. However, actual price changes in the futures 
market result from both temporary order imbalances and from supply and demand factors 
of the underlying commodity of the futures contract. Consequently, estimation of the 
model on the basis of real futures market data might invalidate the assumption of a 
constant equilibrium price during every separate S-shaped price path. However, S-shaped 
price paths due to temporary imbalances occur in a very short period of time, say within a 
matter of minutes. Since the effect of fundamental economic factors occurs over a much 
longer period of time than a few minutes, we might expect that during such a downward-
sloping or upward-sloping price path the price change due to fundamental economic 
factors, i.e. the change of the equilibrium price, is negligible compared to the price 
change due to order imbalances. 
After identifying the individual price paths, we subtract the observations of each 
downward-sloping price path from the price at which the price path started, such that all 
curves become upward sloping.
3 In order to eliminate the general price level effect, we 
shift the curves downward, such that each curve starts at the minimum tick size. Thus, 
each S-curve, after being transformed to become upward sloping, is shifted downward to 
the minimum tick size. In doing so we correct for differences in equilibrium price 
between S-curves. Using the resulting data series, estimates of the dimensions of market 
depth  a and  d are obtained by the following procedure. First, maximum likelihood 
estimates of  s p   and  s t   are obtained by applying ordinary least squares to (4). The   7 






= a  and  ). 1 ( ln s s t - - = d  Second, the standard errors of  s a  and  s d  are 






= h  
(see Cramer, 1986), where  ) ( 2 1 2 1 ¢ d d a a = h  and  ) ( 2 1 2 1 ¢ t t p p = q  are four-
dimensional parameter vectors. Since the maximum likelihood estimators have 
asymptotic normal distributions, t-values may be used to test if the parameters are 
significantly different from zero. To see whether one single market depth price path for 
both upward- and downward-sloping curves suffices, i.e. whether or not the upward-
sloping price path is exactly the reverse of the downward-sloping price path, we test the 
hypothesis  a = a = a 2 1 0 { : H  and  } 2 1 d = d = d . In terms of Equation (4) this 
implies testing  p = p = p 2 1 0 { : H  and  }. 2 1 t = t = t  Since the restrictions are linear 




In order to illustrate the contributions of the model presented above, we apply it to data 
from Euronext. This exchange is one of the largest agricultural  futures exchanges in 
Europe. The trading system employed by the EURONEXT is the open outcry system. 
There are no scalpers on the trading floor and all orders enter the trading floor via 
brokers. Brokers are only allowed to trade by order of a customer. There is no central 
order book on the EURONEXT. The broker only has insight into his/her own order book. 
The customer (hedger or speculator) has no information on outstanding orders. 
Potatoes and hogs are traded on the EURONEXT. The potato futures contract is a 
relatively successful one in the sense that the volume generated (about 200,000 contracts 
annually) is large relative to competitive potato contracts elsewhere in Europe (such as 
the potato futures traded on the London Commodity Exchange and on the Marché à 
Terme International de France). The annual volume is small, however, when compared 
with agricultural futures traded in the United States. Hog futures are not successful as far 
as their volume (about 30,000 contracts annually) is concerned. The minimum tick size 
for the potato and hog futures contracts equals 0.10 Dutch Guilders and 0.005 Dutch 
Guilders, respectively. 
We use real-time transaction-specific data for three futures contracts: potato contract 
delivery April 1996, and hog contract deliveries  August and September 1995.
4 
Descriptive statistics for both the potato and hog futures price and volume series are 
presented in Table 2. The average number of contracts per trading day is relatively large 
for the potato market compared with the hog markets. The latter market faces severe 
problems of market depth which inhibits its contract growth. 
------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------- 
   8 
Empirical Results 
In this section we apply ordinary least squares to (4) and express the estimates of  p and 
t in those of a and  . d  
In Table 3 the estimation results for the potato futures contract, delivery April 1996, 
are displayed. 
------------------------ 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------ 
It can easily be seen that all parameter estimates are significantly greater than zero 
when using a one-sided  t-test and a 0.05 level of significance. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic does not indicate any mis-specification. In spite of its low value, the 
2 R  is 
significantly greater than zero, as indicated by the  ) 46786 , 3 ( F  statistic. The hypothesis 
a = a = a 2 1 0 { : H  and  } 2 1 d = d = d is rejected. Therefore, the market depth for the 
potato futures contracts, delivery April 1996, significantly differs between periods of 
price rise and price fall. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the hog futures contract, delivery August 
1995. Since the hypothesis  0 H  cannot be rejected, we conclude that the market depth for 
this contract is characterized by a single Gompertz curve. So, the upward sloping price 
path is the reverse of the downward sloping price path. Compared with Table 3, the 
statistics in Table 4 lead to similar conclusions with respect to the performance of the 
regression. 
------------------------ 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------ 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the hog futures contracts, delivery 
September 1995. The results are quite similar to those in Table 4. Again, we cannot reject 
. 0 H  
------------------------ 
Table 5 about here 
------------------------ 
To gain more insight into the price path due to order imbalances we draw the Gompertz 
curves for the upward-sloping and downward-sloping potato futures price path (see 
Figure 2) and for the hog futures price paths (see Figure 3), using the parameter estimates 
in Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
--------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
The figure depicts the Gompertz curves for increasing and decreasing price paths. On the 
vertical axis the futures price per contract traded is given. On the horizontal axis the prices 
of successive contracts traded are given, where the serial number of the futures contract is 
denoted by  . i   1 = i  is the first contract traded,  2 = i  is the second contract traded and 
so on. 
In each of the two figures both dimensions of market depth are visualized 
simultaneously. Note that since the upward-sloping price paths for both deliveries of hog   9 
are the reverse of the downward-sloping price paths, we only depict the upward-sloping 
price paths for both hog series in Figure 3. 
------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------- 
The figure depicts the Gompertz curves for hog delivery August and hog delivery 
September. No distinction is made between upward- and downward-sloping price paths, 
because the upward sloping price path is exactly the reverse of the downward sloping 
price path. On the vertical axis the futures price per contract traded is given. On the 
horizontal axis the successive contracts traded are given, where the serial number of the 
futures contract is denoted by  . i   1 = i  is the first contract traded,  2 = i  is the second 
contract traded and so on. 
The upward- and downward-sloping Gompertz curves for  potato futures have 
dissimilar shapes. The first dimension - indicating how far the price falls or rises due to 
order imbalances - is quite large compared with the general price level. This might be due 
to the absence of scalpers. In order to improve the absorption capacity, the EURONEXT 
might consider allowing scalpers on the floor. The second dimension - the rate of price 
change - is higher for the upward-sloping price path than for the downward-sloping price 
path. This can be explained by the fact that there are differences between the number of 
stop-loss buy and stop-loss sell orders. The difference between the numbers of stop-loss 
buy and stop-loss sell orders can be explained by the fact that participants in the potato 
futures market consist of relatively large firms (potato processing industry) who are the 
net buyers of potato futures contracts on the one hand and relatively small firms (potato 
farmers and small potato traders) who are net sellers of potato futures contracts on the 
other. The former participants often use stop-loss buy orders especially because they 
normally make cash forward contracts with retailers regarding potato products (such as 
chips and French fries). When the price rises we observe a trigger effect: a considerable 
number of stop-loss buy orders are executed which push the price upwards and thereby 
reinforce the stop-loss buy order effect which causes an acceleration of the price of 
futures. The potato farmers and small traders usually do not use stop-loss sell orders, but 
wait until the price is satisfactory and then enter the futures market.
5 
Since the curves in Figure 2 do not intersect, we may conclude that the futures market 
is deeper in the case of a sell order imbalance than in the case of a buy order imbalance. 
The problem of the high rate of (adverse) price changes at the EURONEXT might be 
solved by implementing  a mechanism for slowing down the trade process if order 
imbalances do occur and to improve market depth by reporting these. Also the order book 
information can be improved. At the EURONEXT, the order books of the different 
brokers are not linked and the customer has no information with regard to outstanding 
orders. An order book mechanism that allows potential participants to view real-time 
limit orders, displaying the desired prices and quantities at which participants would like 
to trade, will improve the rate of adjustment and the distance between the lower and 
upper bounds. 
The upward- and downward-sloping price paths are similar for both hog deliveries. In 
the hog futures market we observe a symmetry between stop-loss buy and stop-loss sell 
orders in contrast to the potato futures market.
6 Tables 4 and 5 show that a is smaller for 
delivery August than for delivery September indicating that the delivery August performs   10 
better on the first dimension. However, on the second dimension delivery September 
performs better than delivery August (i.e,  d for delivery September is smaller than for 
delivery August). Consequently we observe in Figure 3 that the price paths intersect, 
indicating that for relatively small orders September delivery is deeper than August, 
whereas for large orders August delivery is deeper (see also Table 1). 
 
What are the Perceptions of Traders? A Preliminary Study 
  After we have examined the hard transaction data we are interested in the perceptions 
of traders, since perceptions drive behavior. That is trader behavior, and hence their 
reactions to price movements, are a function of their perceptions, that is the interpretation 
of information, not information itself. In the case that the perceived price path due to 
order imbalances equals the revealed price path due to order imbalances one might argue 
that the market is efficient, as all information is reflected in the price changes. When 
there is a disconnect between perceptions and the revealed price path due to order 
imbalances market efficiency may be compromised and trading might not be optimal.  A 
hedger, who perceives a linear price path during an order imbalance, might be confronted 
with unexpected execution costs if the actual price path is S-shaped, which might lead the 
hedger away from participating in the market thereby decreasing market depth. 
Exchanges instituting changes to promote market depth must be conscious of trader 
perceptions.  If basing their decisions on ex post statistical data, they may find their 
changes ineffective because it did not change trader perceptions of market depth, hence 
failing to change behavior. 
  We wish to examine whether trader perceptions match the true price path during 
temporary order imbalances. Since we have not completed the research at the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT), we  use that the S-shaped price path found at  Euronext as a 
reference point to examine trader perceptions.  Furthermore, we examine whether 




  To investigate what traders think that the price path due to order imbalances looks 
like, we conducted a mail survey with traders of the CBOT in August 2003. The 
addresses of the seat holders at the CBOT were obtained and used to contact the traders. 
Interviews with five traders helped to develop and test the survey; ensuring recipients 
would understand the questions.  
  One problem with the distribution of the survey was CBOT regulations to protect 
the confidentiality of names and addresses of seat holders.  Many seat holders do not 
actively trade themselves; instead, they lease their seat.  We were unable to screen the list 
to delete or replace these individuals.  Only active traders’ survey results were utilized. 
 
Survey Instrument 
The final survey consisted of 6 parts. In the first part, we obtained demographics like 
what type of futures they trade and on what system (electronic vs. open outcry). The 
second part consisted of questions relating to liquidity. Within this part we exposed 
traders to four possible shapes of the price path due to order imbalances, and asked them 
which of the four shapes most resembled the price path due to order imbalances. The four   11 
shapes are described as linear, exponential, zigzag or S shaped (see Figure 4). If in the 
eyes of the traders these shapes did not match their perceptions of imbalances, they were 
allowed to draw their own price path. Subsequently we asked questions about how the 
rate of price, bid-ask spread magnitude, order flow and noise level changes when there is 
an order imbalance. Similar questions were asked for price changes due to fundamental 
shifts. In the third part of the survey we asked questions about the psychological aspects 
of the market place, followed by part four in which questions regarding how they 
perceive electronic trading versus open outcry were asked. The fifth part dealt with the 
type of information sources they use.  The final section addressed concerns facing 
hedging operations. 
--------------------------- 
Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------- 
Results 
  Table 6 shows some descriptive statistics of the traders in our sample.  Fifty 
percent of the traders sampled primarily traded agricultural futures, while only 37.2 
percent used financial futures.  This appears slightly out of balance given that the 
financial volume is over three times the volume of the agricultural market 
(www.cbot.com).  The traders, who did not respond to this question, however, responded 
to the other questions in a similar manner to the financial respondents.  The survey pool 
is very highly concentrating in futures traders (76.7%) as opposed to the options (10.5%). 
 
------------------------ 




Perceived vs. Actual Price Path Due to Order Imbalances 
  Figure 5 shows the proportion of traders that believe that the price path due to 
order imbalances can best described by a linear, exponential, S -shaped function or 
zigzagged. The figure shows that 23.6% believe it is a linear function, 12.7% a n 
exponential function, 25.5% a  S-shaped function and 29.1% a zigzag function.  The 
perceptions are statistically different from one another (p <0.05).  Assuming that the 
actual price path due to order imbalances is S-shaped, the difference between perceptions 
and the actual price path may lead hedgers and traders having unexpectedly higher risks 
and transaction costs. The mismatch between perceptions and actual price path might 
imply that traders are not optimizing their activities and the market is not efficient.     
  Figure 5 visualizes traders' perceptions about the price path due to fundamental 
shifts. The figure shows that 39.1% beliefs it is a linear function, 26.1% an exponential 
function, 13.0% an S-shaped function and 15.2% a zigzag function.  These estimates are 
also statistically significant (p< 0.005).  Most traders believe fundamental shifts occur 
linearly. 
------------------------- 
Figure 5 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
   12 
 
What Traders’ Characteristics are Associated with a Particular Perception? 
  To further gain insight in the perceptions of traders, we grouped traders according 
to their perceptions regarding the price path due to order imbalances. Hence, we 
classified the traders into four groups depending on their perception of the preice path 
due to order imbalances  (the linear, exponential, zigzag and S -shape group) and 
examined whether there are characteristics of traders that differ across groups using 
ANOVA and Chi-square tests.  
------------------------ 
Table 7 about here 
------------------------ 
 
  Table 7 shows  that various  trader characteristics  are associated with  trader 
perceptions of price path during temporary order imbalances.  The first trader 
characteristic is the market the trader utilizes.  47.4% of agricultural traders perceive S-
shaped price path during temporary order imbalances; while 45.0% of financial traders 
believe it is zigzagged and 41.7% of traders utilizing both markets see linear price paths.  
These differences are seen more dramatically in Figure 6. 
 
------------------------ 
Figure 6 about here 
------------------------ 
  It appears that the majority of surveyed agricultural market participants at the 
CBOT perceive the price path due to order imbalances as being S-shaped suggesting that 
for the majority of these agricultural market participants perception correspond with the 
actual price path due to order imbalances. 
  The Chicago financial markets participants perceptions, on the other hand, do not 
match the shape of the price path found in Amsterdam. There are two possibilities for this 
observation. First, the actual shape is not S -shaped or the traders’ perceptions are 
“wrong” meaning do not mach the actual price path. A possible explanation for this mis 
match is the much higher volume and capitalization in the financial markets, which might 
result in fewer order imbalances and/or shorter duration. Subsequently this could cause 
traders to perceive the market just going back forth or could desensitize them to order 
imbalances. 
  Futures traders are pretty evenly split between linear, s-shaped and zigzagged 
price path groups. Options traders, however, are concentrated in the exponential group 
(42.9%).   
  Whether or not the trader was a primary bond trader was associated with different 
perceptions. 53.8% of bond traders perceived the price path as zigzagged. Since, the bond 
market has annual volume slightly higher than the entire agricultural market combined 
and hence having a deeper market might let them believe that the price path due to order 
imbalances is zigzagged. 
  It appears that spreaders perceive the price path due to order imbalances more 
often to be linear than non spreaders. 
  The majority of traders who indicated to take an opposite strategy in times of herd 
behavior feel the price path due to order imbalances to zigzagged, which explains their 
non-herd behavior.   13 
 
  In addition to trader characteristics, we also examined how each of the four 
groups (linear, exponential, S-shape and zigzag group) valued informational sources.  It 
appears that the  traders in the different groups significantly differed regarding the 
importance they attached to commercial signals/activities and government  information 
resources. Traders who ranked the importance of governmental information the highest 
were mainly in the exponential group. The S-shaped group valued commercial signals the 
most. 
------------------------ 
Table 8 about here 
------------------------ 
    Forty-seven percent of the hedgers surveyed stated they were indifferent to price 
concession and much more concerned by the quickness of the execution (48.7% ranking 
quickness very important). Assuming the large corporations hedging attitudes correspond 
to those surveyed, the corporations are probably the source of many of the  order 
imbalances as the try to quickly hedge large orders.  Traders, who find commercial 
signals very important, should be very sensitive to such order imbalances.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that they perceive the S-shaped price path. 
  Traders were asked if they increased (1 on the scale), decreased (5 on the scale), 
or did not change (3 on the scale) their trading when the noise levels increased, but there 
was no new information. Table 9 shows that traders who perceive the price path during 
temporary order imbalances to be S-shaped increased their trading activity during noise. 
 
------------------------ 
Table 9 about here 
------------------------ 
 
Traders who perceived an exponential price path decreased their trading slightly.  This is 
an intriguing finding when combined with the knowledge that increased noise levels are 
associated with order imbalances, see Figure 7.  An exponential price path penalizes 
traders the most if they are wrong about what is occurring.  It makes sense that if one 
perceives the price path this way that one hold back and be more reserved during 
temporary order imbalances. 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
In contrast to the existing market depth measures, we conjecture that the market price 
depth path has an S-shape. This S-shaped price path may well be approximated by the 
Gompertz curve, which allows for a non-symmetrical S -shape and hence, does not 
impose certain restrictions on the length of the different phases. The two parameters of 
our model represent two dimensions of market depth. The first dimension represents the 
distance between the upper and lower bounds, i.e. indicates how far the price falls (rises) 
due to a lack of market depth. The second dimension indicates the rate at which price 
falls or rises. The market depth measure has convenient characteristics. First, it provides 
insights into the underlying structure of market depth and gives guidelines for improving 
market depth. Second, the measure can be used to compare competitive futures contracts. 
Third, the market depth model is estimated with simple regression techniques.   14 
Furthermore, since our measure can be presented in a graphical way, it is relatively easy 
to interpret. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to be aware of the following points. First, 
as we have indicated, our model requires transaction-specific data. Transaction-specific 
data enable us to identify individual downward-sloping price paths and individual 
upward-sloping price paths by assuming that each of these price paths ends when the 
traders expect that price will not change by more than the minimum tick size, and that 
during each price path, which takes place over the space of a few minutes, price change 
due to fundamental economic factors will be negligible compared to the price change due 
to order imbalances, i.e. we may expect that over such a short period of time the 
equilibrium price does not change. Clearly this is not a conceptually perfect method to 
distangle price changes due to order imbalances and price changes due to fundamental 
shifts. A potential solution would be to complement the transaction specific data with 
data on when new information arrived in the market and the content of that information. 
Doing so would allow us to relate price changes to fundamental shifts more clearly. 
Efforts are underway to construct such a data set.  
Second, and this a major limitation of our study, we did not test the S-shape model 
against other models describing different shapes. The relatively low R
2 of our model 
might hint that the S-shape curve might not be the optimal. Furthermore we assume that 
the price path due to order imbalances is the same across futures contracts and across 
trading systems. One could hypothesize that there might be heterogeneity in the shapes of 
the price path due to order imbalances where the heterogeneity is driven by commodity 
type and trading system. Future research should address these two important issues. 
In this paper we investigated the revealed price path due to order imbalances with 
futures contracts traded at Euronext, whereas the perceptions were measured with traders 
who trade at the CBOT. Comparing and contrasting perceived and revealed price path 
due to order imbalances is not that compelling. Future research should measures 
perceptions and examining actual price paths due to order imbalances  for the same 
contracts traded at the same exchange. 
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Table 1. Effects of changes in the two dimensions on market depth 
  a increases  d  increases  a increases 
and  d  decreases 
a increases 
and  d  decreases 
Lack of market 







on magnitude order 
flow 
depending 
on magnitude order 
flow 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the real-time transaction-specific futures prices 
  Futures Contracts 
  Potato delivery    
April 1996 
Hog delivery     
August 1995 
Hog delivery  
September 1995 
Number of observations 
(i.e. contracts traded) 
46791 
(April ’95 -      
August ’95) 
2742 
(February ’95 -  
August ’95) 
2317 
(February ’95 -    
August ’95) 
Average number of 
contracts per trading day 
503  24  22 
Average price per 
contract* 
43.4  2.330  2.265 2.276 
Standard deviation of the 
price 
18.0  0.150  0.120 
Minimum price  21.7  2.065  2.060 
Maximum price  79.0  2.655  2.650 
* The futures price for potatoes is quoted in Dutch Guilders per 100 kilogram whereas the hogs are quoted in 
Dutch Guilders per kilogram live weight.   20 
 
Table 3. Estimates of the parameters describing the underlying dimensions of market depth 
of the potato futures contract, delivery April 1996 
Contract      Parameter estimates Gompertz 
curve* 
      a  d  
Potatoes futures contracts, 
delivery April 1996 
  downward sloping 
upward sloping 
1.374 (0.057)                       
1.013 (0.053) 
0.053 (0.002)                                 
0.060 (0.002) 
Number of observations  46790       
2 R   0.099  Probability of F(3, 46786)  < 0.001 
F(3, 46786)   638  Durbin - Watson statistic  1.914 
F(2, 46786) for  } and { : 2 1 2 1 0 d = d = d a = a = a H   7.760   
Probability of F(2, 46786)  < 0.001   
* standard errors in parentheses.   21 
Table 4. Estimates of the parameters describing the underlying dimensions of market depth 
of the hog futures contract, delivery August 1995 
Contract      Parameter estimates                                  
Gompertz curve* 
      a  d  
Hog futures contracts, 
delivery August 1995 
    0.039                   
(0.016) 
0.159                        
(0.009) 
Number of observations  2741       
2 R   0.249  Probability of F(1, 2739)  < 0.001 
F(1, 2739)   348  Durbin – Watson statistic  1.811 
F(2, 2739) for  } and { : 2 1 2 1 0 d = d = d a = a = a H   0.217   
Probability of F(2, 2739)  0.805   
* standard errors in parentheses.   22 
Table 5. Estimates of the parameters describing the underlying dimensions of market depth 
of the hog futures contract, delivery September 1995 
Contract      Parameter estimates                              
Gompertz curve* 
      a  d  
Hog futures contracts, 
delivery September 1995 
    0.044           
(0.022) 
0.115                    
(0.008) 
Number of observations  2314       
2 R   0.200  Probability of F(1, 2312)  < 0.001 
F(1, 2312)   348  Durbin – Watson statistic  1.855 
F(2, 2312) for } and { : 2 1 2 1 0 d = d = d a = a = a H   0.136   
Probability of F(2, 2312)  0.873   
* standard errors in parentheses.   23 
Table 6. Characteristics of traders in sample 
  Frequency  Percent    Frequency  Percent 
Primary Commodity Traded  Primary Type of Derivative 
Agriculture  43  50.0%  Futures  66  76.7% 
Finance  32  37.2%  Options   9  10.5% 
Other   3    3.5%  Other   0    0.0% 
No response   8    9.3%  No response  11  12.8% 
   24 
Table 7. Characteristics affecting traders’ perceptions of order imbalances 
  Trade groups based on perceived order imbalances 
Characteristic    Linear  Expon.  S-shape  Zigzag 
Ag  21.1%  15.8%  47.4%  15.8% 
Fin  15.0%  15.0%  15.0%  45.0% 
Is the trader in the 
agriculture or financial 
markets?  Com  41.7% 
 
  0.0%  16.7%  25.0% 
Fut.  25.0%  6.8%  29.5%  29.5%  Does the trader trade 
futures or options?  Opt.  14.3% 
 
42.9%  14.3%  28.6% 
No  28.9%  13.2%  31.6%  21.1%  Is the trader primarily a 
bond trader?  Yes    7.7% 
 
  7.7%  15.4%  53.8% 
No  14.6%  14.6%  23.8%  34.1%  Is the trader a spreader? 
Yes  53.8% 
 
   0.0%  23.1%  15.4% 
No  22.2%  13.9%  33.3%  19.4%  Does the trader take 
opposite positions in herd 
behavior (scalper 
behavior)? 
Yes  18.2%    9.1%    9.1%  63.6% 
*The hypothesis that the mean of these variables is equal was rejected at the 10% level using Chi-Square.   25 
Table 8. Importance of information source for the different four different groups of  
              traders 
Information Source  Trade groups based on perceived order 
imbalances 
   (1 = least important, 5 most important)  Linear  Expon.  S-shape  Zigzag 
Commercial signals  3.818  2.600  4.231  4.000 
Government information  3.546  4.333  3.400  3.5385 
*The hypothesis that the mean of these variables is equal was rejected at the 10% level using ANOVA. 
   26 
Table 9. Affects of noise in the absence of information to trader’s market activity for 
the different four different groups of traders 
  Increase in Noise Level  Trade groups based on perceived order 
imbalances 
    (1 = increases, 5 = decreases)  Linear  Expon.  S-shape  Zigzag 
Level of trading   1.917  3.500  1.69  2.14 
*The hypothesis that the mean of these variables is equal was rejected at the 5% level using ANOVA.   27 
 
 
Figure 1.  Price pattern of a sell order in a thin market  
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Figure 2. The Gompertz curves for the potato futures contract delivery April 
   29 
 
Figure 3. The Gompertz curves for hog futures contracts deliveries August and September 
 
 
FIGURE 4 TO BE INCLUDED 
 
Shape  Percent  Percent 
  Order Imbalance  Fundamental Shift 
Linear  23.6%  39.1% 
Exponential  12.7%  26.1% 
S-shape  25.5%  13.0% 
Zigzag  29.1%  15.2% 
Other    9.1%    6.5% 
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Figure 5. Perceptions of the price path due to order Imbalances vs. perceptions of the price 
path during fundamental shifts 
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Figure 6. Characteristics associated with traders' perceptions about price path due to order 
imbalnces   32 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1  There is a large volume of research (for example, French and Roll, 1986; Fama, 
1991; Stein, 1991; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 
1994; Oliver and Verrechia, 1994; Hiraki, Maberly, and Takezawa, 1995) on 
information, market efficiency and market liquidity. In these articles, information 
refers to changes in the fundamental economic factors (supply and demand factors 
of the underlying ‘commodity’ of the futures contract traded). Conceptually, we 
can split price changes into changes due to fundamental economic factors and 
changes due to the fact that there is a temporary order imbalance. In this study, we 
concentrate on the latter. 
 
2   The resistance price level marks the upper and lower boundary between which the 
price fluctuates according to the participants if the equilibrium price is constant. 
The equilibrium price is determined by fundamental economic factors. 
 
3  From the data it is not clear where the exact split between an increasing and 
decreasing price path should be imposed when two or more contracts in between 
are traded at the same price. Therefore, to determine the split we apply the 
following procedure: for an odd number of contracts traded at the same price we 
use the middle contract, and for an even number of constant contracts we employ 
a random assignment with equal probabilities. 
 
4   The reason that we investigate these three futures contracts is a practical one. In 
order to estimate the model we had to obtain transaction-specific data. These data 
were gathered by the exchange on our request. Normally the exchange only saves 
the daily close price, high price, low price and traded volume. We were able to 
receive transaction-specific prices only for the three futures contracts investigated 
in the paper. 
 
5   We acknowledge the information we received on this subject from the brokers at 
the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange. 
 
6   We acknowledge the information we received on this subject from the brokers at 
the Amsterdam Agricultural Futures Exchange. 
 